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Since the early days of the post-September 11th era and the beginning of the infamous 
war on terror operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, Canadians have become acutely aware 
of the horrors of torture. Torture was originally publicized as a disgraceful practice only 
embraced by the enemy; an enemy who would shamelessly promote its cause by 
disseminating propaganda depicting nothing but the cruellest and most inhumane 
treatment of captured adversaries. This, the public was told, is why they are the “enemy” 
and we are the “liberators”. As early as 2004, this simple narrative started to change. 
In 2004, allegations of torture began to surface at the US-operated Bagram Theatre 
Internment Facility in the Parwan province of Afghanistan. The abominable treatment of 
some 645 detainees held at Bagram was famously chronicled in the 2007 documentary 
Taxi to the Dark Side. The US Army Criminal Investigation Command at Bagram found 
7 cases of confirmed or suspected detainee homicide1 and probable cause to charge 27 
military police guards and military intelligence interrogators with a variety of crimes 
including involuntary manslaughter.2 In 2004 the world also became aware of the US 
detention centre Camp Delta, at Guantánamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba, when the New 
York Times published excerpts from a report of the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC), which had visited the facilities. Camp Delta was host to 550 detainees 
who, according to the ICRC, were exposed to loud noises, humiliating acts, solitary 
confinement, temperature extremes, forced positions, and beatings.3 As horrifying as the 
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accounts of torture at both Bagram and Camp Delta were, what was perhaps most 
emblematic of the “liberators” fall from grace was the well documented series of 
atrocities that took place at the US Abu Ghraib detention centre in Iraq. The same year 
that stories of prisoner abuse in Afghanistan and Guantánamo Bay became public, The 
New Yorker magazine published a graphic account of American soldiers engaging in 
behaviour that ranged from urinating on detainees to pouring phosphoric acid on them.4  
The world was shocked. Canada was shocked. Despite the fact that the allegations of 
torture all seemed to be contained within American facilities, Canadians were 
particularly concerned that if torture and “enhanced” interrogation methods had become 
acceptable for our closest military ally, the Canadian government would need to be 
vigilant in disassociating itself from these kinds of activities. Regardless of any special 
security concerns that may have developed in the post-9/11 world, Canadians, it can be 
said, have a low tolerance for torture. As one Canadian official expressed,  
Canada has always been a powerful advocate of international law and 
human rights. That is a keystone of who we are as Canadians and what we 
have always stood for as a people and nation. If we disregard our core 
principles and values, we also lose our moral authority abroad. If we are 
complicit in the torture of [detainees], how can we credibly promote 
human rights in Tehran or Beijing?5   
It was within this controversial and politically-charged context that Canadians initially 
became concerned with the fate of Afghan detainees who had passed through Canadian 
custody. Groups such as Amnesty International and the BC Civil Liberties Association 
have claimed that when the Canadian Forces first assumed command of the Provincial 
Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kandahar city in 2005 and began transferring detainees 
to Afghan authorities, those detainees were tortured. It is further alleged that Canada was 
aware that detainees were being tortured by Afghan authorities but persisted with 
transfers regardless, thereby endangering the lives and security of an unknown number 
of detainees.6 This, it has been claimed, amounts to complicity in the torture of prisoners 
during a non-international armed conflict and qualifies as a war crime. In 2009, the 
Canadian Department of National Defence (DND) and the House of Commons Special 
Committee on the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan both began investigating the 
allegations of deficiencies in the detainee transfer process.7  
                                                       
4 Seymour M Hersh, “Torture at Abu Ghraib” The New Yorker (10 May 2004), online: 
newyorker.com  
< http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2004/05/10/040510fa_fact>. 
5 Canada, House of Commons, Special Committee on the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan, 
“Study: Transfer of Afghan Detainees” in Official Report of Debates (Hansard), No 15 (18 
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Afghanistan In-Theatre Detainee Handling Process Board of Inquiry, 2009).  
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Unsatisfied with the government’s response and sceptical of how seriously the 
allegations of war crimes were being treated, human rights activists Michael Byers of the 
University of British Columbia and William Schabas of the Irish Centre for Human 
Rights appealed to the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC).8 Based on 
publicly available evidence, they claimed there was strong reason to believe that Canada 
had been complicit in the torture of Afghan detainees and had violated the war crimes 
provision of the Rome Statute. 9 They further claimed that since Canada was a party to 
the Rome Statute, and since the Canadian government was not conducting a “genuine” 
investigation, the ICC should exercise jurisdiction over the matter and prosecute those 
responsible.  
As confident as Byers, Schabas and many others are in their assertion that Canada has 
committed war crimes, the matter is unfortunately far more complex and far less certain. 
One of the primary reasons for this complexity is that Canada is not the party that 
allegedly committed torture. It is widely agreed that the acts of torture were undertaken 
solely by Afghan authorities, making them the perpetrators in this case. If the allegations 
against Canada turn out to be founded, Canada’s participation could at best be 
characterised as accessory. This brings the matter into an exceptionally murky area of 
law that asks the question of how and to what extent accessory liability operates in war 
crimes both domestically and internationally. These issues will be explored in the 
balance of this paper.   
In Part I, theories of individual criminal responsibility will be explored, including the 
doctrines of causation and complicity. The doctrine of causation attributes liability to 
principal offenders who cause some prohibited consequence through their own actions. 
The doctrine of complicity operates differently to create accessory liability for a party to 
an offence who does not actually commit the crime in question. A principal commits an 
offence through their own conduct, while an accessory derives criminal liability from the 
conduct of another through solicitation or facilitation.10  
In the international setting, the doctrine of complicity has given rise to controversial 
forms of individual criminal responsibility, including: i) conspiracy; ii) criminal 
organizations; and iii) Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE).  Emerging from the post-World 
War II International Military Tribunal (IMT) and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), all three concepts can operate to impute guilt to 
individuals who somehow participated in collective crimes even if they themselves did 
not commit the specific crime in question. While these concepts may initially seem to 
give credence to the allegations of Canadian criminal responsibility in Afghanistan, it 
will be shown that their liberal use in international law has come dangerously close to 
guilt by association and as a result they lack legitimacy as legal concepts. 
                                                       
8 Letter from Prof Michael Byers and Prof William A. Schabas OC to Luis Moreno-Ocampo, 
Prosecutor, International Criminal Court (3 December 2009) online: Rideau Institute 
<http://rideauinstitute.ca/file-library/Byers-Schabas-Letter-to-ICC-3-Dec-2009.pdf>. 
9 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 18 December 1998, Can TS 2002 No 13, (Ratification 7 
July 2000) [Rome Statute]. 
10 Markus D Dubber, “Criminalizing Complicity: A Comparative Analysis” (2007) 5 J Int'l Crim 
Just 977 at 987.  
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In Part II, the question of Canadian accessory liability will be considered under the legal 
framework of the War Crimes Act;11 Canada’s implementing legislation for the Rome 
Statute. The War Crimes Act criminalizes torture during armed conflict as a war crime, 
similar to the Rome Statute, and generates criminal responsibility for accessory 
participation in war crimes by reference to the Criminal Code.12 The operation of the 
Criminal Code within the context of international crimes has the potential to bring two 
different systems of law into conflict. A comparative analysis of Canadian criminal law 
and judicial interpretation of the War Crimes Act will produce an estimation of where the 
law sits in this regard.  
In Part III, the Canadian legal framework for accessories to war crimes will be compared 
with the international framework provided by the Rome Statute. Article 2513 of the Rome 
Statute identifies the specific modes of individual criminal responsibility that, in 
conjunction with the listed crimes, will satisfy the conduct and fault requirement of an 
offence. Two of these modes of responsibility are relevant to Canada’s activities in 
Afghanistan: a) “aids, abets or otherwise assists” (Art. 25(3)(c)); and b) “in any other 
way contributes to… a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose” (Art. 
25(3)(d)). While seeming comprehensive,  the interpretation of these provisions has 
proved problematic; particularly with regard to their fault and conduct requirements. 
Both requirements will be considered in an attempt to provide an interpretation of the 
provisions consistent with the text of the Rome Statute and, where the text is found 
lacking, is informed by international jurisprudence and supplemented by general 
principles of criminal law.  
Finally, in Part IV, the somewhat ambiguous domestic and international legal framework 
for accessories to war crimes will be applied to the case of the Canadian Forces detainee 
transfer operations in Afghanistan. As preliminary investigations are still ongoing, the 
precise facts of the case are not yet known, and no prediction can be made as to the 
relative culpability of any of the potential accused. What will be considered instead is 
the case the prosecution would have to meet if charges were laid in either a Canadian or 
international forum.          
I. INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY  
The main function of criminal law is to affix blame to individuals for their actions or the 
harmful consequences of their acts.14  That the law describes certain acts and results as 
harmful, and therefore worthy of punishment, is not generally controversial. More 
disputed, however, is the justification for holding an individual legally responsible for a 
particular act or consequence. Over time, the law has presented different explanations for 
responsibility ranging from vicarious liability to direct causation. According to H.L.A. 
Hart and A.M. Honoré, in their book Causation in the Law, “doing” or “causing” harm 
                                                       
11 Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, SC 2000, c 24 [War Crimes Act].  
12 RSC 1985, c C-46.  
13 Rome Statute, supra note 9 at art 25.  
14 Sanford H Kadish, “Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of Doctrine” 
(1985) 73 Calif L Rev 323 at 329. 
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constitute the primary ground for holding someone responsible and is the most obvious, 
and least disputable, reason for ascribing individual criminal liability.15   
According to Christopher Kutz of the Berkeley School of Law, the two modern 
dominant theories of causation both descend from David Hume’s famous 
pronouncement: “We may define a cause to be an object followed by another, and where 
all the objects, similar to the first, are followed by objects similar to the second. Or, in 
other words, where, if the first object had not been, the second never had existed.”16 As 
Kutz explains, the first half of this sentiment reflects the “regularity” concept of 
causation: one event (or factor) is the cause of another event when it is an insufficient 
but necessary element of a set of conditions that are actually sufficient but not necessary 
for the occurrence of the second event. The second half of Hume’s statement reflects the 
classical theory of causation defined in terms of counterfactuals.17 The two concepts of 
causation might be referred to as direct and indirect causation. In cases of direct 
causation the conduct of a principal actor is conditio sine qua non under a traditional 
causal analysis, and attribution of responsibility is not controversial. In cases of indirect 
causation, the accused’s conduct (which is necessary but not sufficient) is less obvious as 
a basis for responsibility. Indirect causation is generally referred to as complicity or 
accessory liability.18  
a) Doctrine of Complicity  
Complicity is a derivative form of criminal responsibility, in that the liability of the 
accused is dependent on the actions of the principal offender. As Markus D. Dubber 
explains in his article Criminalizing Complicity: A Comparative Analysis, the doctrine of 
complicity is simply one way of satisfying the conduct element of an offence without 
addressing other elements, such as the result. The principal will satisfy the conduct 
element through direct causation, while an accessory will satisfy it indirectly through the 
principal’s act.19 In order to fulfil the conduct requirement of an offence under the 
doctrine of complicity the accessory must have participated in the commission of the 
offence in some way. While various jurisdictions differ on what threshold of 
participation will suffice, the common law traditionally requires more than mere 
                                                       
15 HLA Hart & AM Honoré, Causation in the Law, (UK: Oxford University Press, 1959) at 62. 
16 Christopher Kutz, “Causeless Complicity” (2007) 1 Crim L Phil 289 at 296. 
17 Ibid. Counterfactual analysis reflects the causal claim of: event A caused event B; but for A, B 
would not exist. 
18 It is debateable as to whether or not complicity is a form of causation. For example, Sandford 
Kadish has said: “In the same sense and for the same reasons that a person’s genes, upbringing, 
and social surroundings are not seen as the cause of his actions, neither are the actions of another 
seen as the cause of his actions. We regard a person’s acts as the products of his choice, not as an 
inevitable, natural result of a chain of events. Therefore, antecedent events do not cause a person to 
act in the same way that they cause things to happen, and neither do the antecedent acts of others. 
To treat the acts of others as causing a person’s actions (in the physical sense of cause) would be 
inconsistent with the premise on which we hold a person responsible.” Kadish, supra note 14 at 
333. For Kadish, complicity is distinct from causation as a method for imposing individual 
criminal responsibility.  
19 Dubber, supra note 10 at 980. 
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presence at the commission of the offence and some link between the actions of the 
accessory and the harm caused. 20 
Acts that will satisfy the conduct requirement of complicity have been characterized in 
numerous ways. The noted scholar Sanford Kadish of the University of California has 
described two categories of complicitous conduct: i) intentionally influencing the 
decision of the primary party to commit a crime, and ii) intentionally helping the primary 
actor commit the crime, where the helping acts themselves constitute no part of the acts 
prohibited by the definition of the crime.21 Alternatively, Francis Bowes Sayre of 
Harvard Law School has described three different categories of complicitous conduct: i) 
authorization, procurement, incitation or moral encouragement, ii) knowledge plus 
acquiescence, and iii) the proximate consequence that grows out of an offence that was 
indirectly caused under i) or ii) that results in a separate offence that has not been 
authorized or consented to.22  
In addition to having committed conduct that falls into one of these categories 
(regardless of which categories are chosen), Kadish also notes that an accomplice’s 
efforts must have met with some success.23 According to Kadish, “the common notion of 
success is captured in the ordinary locution of something having mattered, of it having 
made a difference.”24 This difference, however, need not have been necessary in order 
for the offence to have been committed; it is enough if the accessory’s conduct merely 
rendered the offence easier for the principal.25 Since it can never be known with certainty 
whether an unnecessary contribution to an offence by an accessory has actually “made a 
difference”, Kadish explains that the conduct requirement will include any conduct other 
than that which “demonstrably failed to achieve its purpose because it never reached its 
target.”26 To avoid the injustice that could result from such an exceptionally low conduct 
requirement, one that notably strains the notion of indirect causation and may even 
suggest no causation, the fault requirement of complicity is consistently recognized as 
full intent—the accessory must intend their conduct to further the criminal purpose of 
the principal.27   
In the past few decades, a particular theory of complicity has gained prominence as a 
preferred method for ascribing liability in international criminal law. It developed as a 
way to address participation in group crimes where complex relationships may exist 
between the principal(s) and the accessory(ies) in which the contribution of an accessory 
may be remote from the commission of a specific crime but is linked to the actions of the 
principal through a common purpose. This form of complicity has become known for 
upholding the exceedingly low conduct requirement described by Kadish, while at the 
                                                       
20 State v Tally, 102 Ala 25 at 736, 15 So 722 (1894).  
21 Kadish, supra note 14 at 342. 
22 Francis Bowes Sayre, “Criminal Responsibility for the Acts of Another” (1930) 43 Harv L Rev 
689 at 704. 
23 Kadish, supra note 14 at 356. 
24 Ibid at 357. 
25 State v Tally, supra note 20.  
26 Kadish, supra note 14 at 358. 
27 Ibid at 354. 
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same time applying a lower and lower fault requirement. Theories of accessory liability 
that concern participation in a common purpose are subject to considerable criticism in 
the domestic sphere because, unless narrowly construed, this type of liability can come 
dangerously close to assigning guilt for mere membership in a group. In the realm of 
international criminal law, common purpose liability as a form of complicity has taken 
shape in three doctrinal stratagems that serve to expand the potential liability of an 
accused far beyond their physical perpetration of crimes.28 These include prosecution of 
an accessory as part of: i) a conspiracy;29 ii) a criminal organization; or iii) a JCE.         
i. Conspiracy  
Conspiracy is a common law theory of group liability that can operate as an inchoate 
offence separate from complicity, or as a form of complicity. As its own distinct 
concept, conspiracy is the criminalization of an agreement to engage in unlawful acts; a 
common design to do something unlawful and an intention by all parties to put the 
common design into effect.30 Unlike complicity, conspiracy as a distinct offence can be a 
direct rather than derivative form of liability and does not require the intended offence 
actually be committed.  
Conspiracy arises as a form of complicity when illegal acts which were not the primary 
objective of the conspirators nevertheless manifest as a product of the common design. If 
a party to a conspiracy commits an offence which was a foreseeable consequence of the 
common purpose of the collective, then all parties may derive liability for the offence 
whether or not they had personal knowledge of its actual or planned commission. This 
theory of liability was most famously articulated in the American Pinkerton doctrine of 
1946. In Pinkerton,31 the defendant was held accountable for the illegal acts of his 
brother in operating an illegal still because he had previously conspired with his brother 
to operate the still, regardless of the fact that he was in prison during the commission of 
the offence. The US Supreme Court imputed liability to the defendant based on the 
theory that:  
…so long as the partnership in crime continues, the partners act for each 
other in carrying it forward. It is settled that an overt act of one partner 
may be the act of all without any new agreement specifically directed to 
that act… The criminal intent to do the act is established by the formation 
of the conspiracy. The act done was in execution of the enterprise… [and 
is] attributable to the others for the purpose of holding them responsible 
for the substantive offense.32 
                                                       
28 Jens Meierhenrich, “Conspiracy in International Law” (2006) 2 Annu RL Soc Sci 341 at 352.  
29 While it is debateable whether or not conspiracy can be considered a proper form of complicity, 
for the purposes of this paper it will be included under the broad umbrella of complicity as a 
known form of derivative liability.  
30 R v O’Brien, [1954] SCR 666 at para 7, [1955] 2 DLR 311.  
31 Pinkerton v United States, 328 US 640, 66 SCt 1180 (1946) [Pinkerton]. 
32 Ibid at 1184.  
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Conspiracy theory has been referred to as the darling of the modern prosecutor’s 
nursery33 given the ease with which it allows responsibility for an offence to be imputed 
to an individual where there may not be sufficient evidence to establish principal or even 
accessory liability. There are public policy reasons underlying this expansive form of 
liability, most of which stem from the threat posed by organized crime and the peculiar 
nature of criminal groups which can create tremendous difficulties for prosecution. An 
individual may contribute to a criminal enterprise by committing a small act which, 
although lawful unto itself (such as providing minor financial support to an 
organization), may facilitate a criminal act through several degrees of separation that 
causes serious harm (such as the acquisition of weapons used to commit a massacre). 
The geographic, temporal and even causal distance between the accused and the specific 
offence may preclude prosecution without a special theory of liability.   
While conspiracy theory appears practical from a prosecutorial stand point, it begs the 
question of whether an individual can ever be too far removed from the commission of a 
crime, or whether doctrines of criminal responsibility will simply continue to grow more 
expansive making everyone with any connection to anyone potentially liable for 
anything. As one scholar noted, “the sprawling and ambiguous nature of a conspiracy 
can cast a wide net and sweep up vast numbers of individuals who are likely to be 
innocent of any serious wrongdoing, particularly when the threat [posed by the common 
purpose of the organization] is an ambiguous one.”34 
Conspiracy theory was absorbed into international criminal law during the Nuremberg 
trials after World War II. Given the effectiveness of conspiracy theory in dealing with 
organized crime, the US was a strong advocate of using it as a vehicle to convict the 
Nazi party, which was characterized as essentially a vast criminal organization. The 
American vision was for conspiracy theory to provide a solution to logistical problems 
of “appalling dimensions” in finding and organizing evidence, in connecting specific 
crimes to specific individuals and in staging the trials themselves.35 The proposal to 
include a charge of conspiracy was initially developed by the US War Department, but 
the sweeping nature of such a charge immediately encountered resistance from the US’s 
own Judge Advocate General and Justice Department, not to mention the other allied 
nations.36 Controversy arose not only because of the perceived malleability of conspiracy 
to aggressive prosecutorial strategies but also because of the absence of this type of 
liability in civil law systems. During the discussions of whether or not to include 
conspiracy in the London Charter of the IMT, it was famously reported that:  
The Russians [sic] and French seemed unable to grasp all the implications 
of the concept; when they finally did grasp it, they were genuinely 
                                                       
33 Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S Martinez, “Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, 
Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law” (2005) 93 Cal L 
Rev 75 at 137.  
34 Aaron Fichtelberg, “Conspiracy and International Criminal Justice” (2006) 17 Crim LF 149 at 
157. 
35 Allan Ryan, “Nuremberg’s Contributions to International Law” (2007) 30 BC Int’l & Comp L 
Rev 55 at 62.  
36 Ibid.  
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shocked. The French viewed it entirely as a barbarous legal mechanism 
unworthy of modern law, while the Soviets seemed to have shaken their 
head in wonderment—a reaction, some cynics may believe, prompted by 
envy.37 
In the end, conspiracy was added to the London Charter which attributed liability to 
“leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or 
execution of a common plan or conspiracy.”38 It was suggested that the procedure by 
which an individual would be convicted on the basis of participation in a conspiracy 
would be a two stage process. First, the major organizations of the Nazi party and 
government would be tried “both with the commission of their atrocious crimes, and also 
with joint participation in a broad criminal enterprise which included and intended these 
crimes, or was reasonably calculated to bring them about.”39 The conviction of the 
organization would provide the evidence of a conspiracy and common agreement that 
would be necessary to convict individual members in the second stage of the process. 
Once an individual’s membership in a criminal conspiracy was established, criminal 
responsibility for all crimes emanating from the common purpose could be imputed.  
The idea that an enormous, abstract and amorphous organization such as the Nazi party 
could be convicted of a general conspiracy to commit aggressive war and that this 
conviction could then be followed by hundreds of thousands of summary convictions in 
which every member of the party, no matter how low ranking or uninvolved, could be 
liable for the most egregious crimes as the foreseeable consequence of a vaguely defined 
“conspiracy to commit aggressive war” made everyone, including the judges of the IMT, 
uncomfortable.40 It was eventually decided by the tribunal that convictions based on a 
common plan or conspiracy had to amount to more than simply guilt by association, less 
the judicial process lose all legitimacy. As a result, the conspiracy theory was 
significantly reigned in and largely supplemented, if not completely replaced, by the 
related theory of criminal organizations which provided greater structural and procedural 
requirements for prosecution based on participation in a common plan.  
ii. Criminal Organizations   
As mentioned above, the original American proposal at Nuremberg was to use 
conspiracy as the legal vehicle through which mass convictions would ensue. The IMT 
would formally indict major Nazi organizations, establish their criminality based on a 
collective conspiracy and bind military courts in subsequent proceedings where 
individuals would be tried for their membership in the criminal organizations.41 
Although this prosecutorial strategy was based on the common law conception of 
conspiracy, it differed from the traditional doctrine in that individuals would not 
                                                       
37 Bradley F Smith, Reaching Judgement at Nuremberg (London: Deutsch, 1977) at 51. 
38 Charter of the International Military Tribunal (IMT), in Agreement for the Prosecution and 
Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis (London Agreement), August 8, 
1945, 58 Stat 1544, EAS No 472, 82 UNTS 280 [London Charter] at art 6.  
39 Ryan, supra note 35 at 63.  
40 Danner & Martinez, supra note 33 at 113.  
41 Ibid.  
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necessarily be punished for being a party to a conspiracy to commit crimes, but for their 
voluntary membership in an organization that actually committed crimes. This approach 
was received with some hesitation by the IMT, which noted that, “a member of an 
organisation… [that is] declared to be criminal may be subsequently convicted of the 
crime of membership and be punished for that crime by death… This is a far reaching 
and novel procedure. Its application, unless properly safeguarded, may produce great 
injustice.”42 This concern was echoed by the US’s own Assistant Attorney General 
Herbert Wechsler who feared that the expansive nature of the organizational charge 
would lack legitimacy if too many people were caught in its wide net of criminal 
responsibility.43 
Nevertheless, the Tribunal reluctantly undertook the daunting task of trying to determine 
the criminality of seven Nazi organizations: the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party; the 
Gestapo; the Der Sicherheitsdienst des Reichsfuehrer (SD); the Die Schutzstaffeln der 
Nationalsocialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei (SS); the Die Sturmabteilungen der 
Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei (SA); the Reich Cabinet; and the 
General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces.44 As Allan Ryan, 
former Director of the Office of Special Investigations at the US Department of Justice, 
explains in his article Nuremberg’s Contributions to International Law:  
It was a nightmarish task just to determine how these organizations were 
defined, particularly those that went through repeated rounds of 
reorganization and consolidation with both state and party offices, and 
whose missions and responsibilities were constantly adjusted, officially 
and unofficially. Was someone who joined the Sicherheitsdienst (SD) (the 
German intelligence service) in 1944 joining the same organization that 
had existed in 1939? Was a soldier in the Waffen SS—its military arm—a 
member of the same organization as a henchman in its domestic security 
operation?45 
In an attempt to resolve these issues comprehensively, the IMT articulated four main 
criteria that would define a criminal organization. First, there had to be a group bound 
together and organized for a common purpose such that its membership would have 
understood that they were participating in a collective purpose. Second, the common 
purpose had to be connected to a crime under the London Charter and this purpose had 
to be pervasively held among the membership. Third, membership in the group had to be 
voluntary; individuals who were conscripted could not be held liable for the actions of 
the group unless they were personally implicated in a specific offence. Finally, members 
needed to be aware of the criminal purpose of the group or aware of its criminal acts.46 
Also, since the criminal organization charge had been created as a mechanism for 
                                                       
42 Office of United States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy 
and Aggression: Opinion and Judgment (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 
1947) [IMT] at 85. 
43 Danner & Martinez, supra note 33 at 119. 
44 IMT, supra note 42 at 86. 
45 Ryan, supra note 35 at 83-84. 
46 IMT, supra note 42 at 86. 
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judicial efficiency, the organization in question also had to be of a sufficient size so as to 
make it impractical to try each member individually. This informal size requirement was 
instrumental in the IMT’s decision to acquit the Reich Cabinet from the criminal 
organization charge, because, as the Tribunal said, “the group of persons here charged is 
so small that members could be conveniently tried in proper cases without resort to a 
declaration that the Cabinet of which they were members was criminal.”47  
In addition to the Reich Cabinet, the IMT’s structural requirements for a criminal 
organization resulted in the acquittal of three other Nazi organizations, leaving only the 
Leadership Corps, the Gestapo, and the SS as criminal. The SA was acquitted because it 
was found that although its members “took part in the beer hall feuds and were used for 
street fighting in battles against political opponents,”48 there was no pervasively held 
common purpose related to a crime under the London Charter. The General Staff and 
High Command, on the other hand, were acquitted because, as the IMT explained: “[a 
member] could not know he was joining a group or organisation, for such organisation 
did not exist except in the charge of the Indictment. He knew only that he had achieved a 
certain high rank in one of the three services, and could not be conscious of the fact that 
he was becoming a member of anything so tangible as a ‘group,’ as that word is 
[commonly] used.”49  
Originally, once an organization’s criminality had been determined the burden was 
supposed to shift to its members in subsequent hearings to prove that they did not join 
the organization voluntarily. This changed with the IMT’s finding that for an 
organization to be criminal not only did its membership need to be voluntary but 
individual members also needed to be aware of the criminal purpose of the group. It was 
now the prosecution who would be required to establish both voluntary membership and 
personal knowledge in order to gain an individual conviction. This meant that contrary to 
the American proposal, membership in a criminal organization alone would not be 
enough to establish guilt.  
The IMT’s requirement of voluntariness and knowledge combined with the structural 
requirements for criminal organizations and the elimination of the reverse onus all 
served to negate some of the most controversial implications of the organizational and 
conspiracy charges in the Nuremberg trials. While the individual fault requirement of 
personal knowledge was low and the conduct requirement of mere voluntary 
membership even lower, fairness was thought to have been attained by setting the 
organizational requirements fairly high. Nevertheless, the criminal organization doctrine 
still proved to be far reaching and resulted in the conviction of individuals who had done 
nothing more than maintain membership in one of the convicted Nazi organizations 
while aware of its criminal purpose. In one instance, a judge in the Bavarian and Reich 
Ministries of Justice named Joseph Altstoetter was convicted based on his membership 
in a criminal organization because he had once been a member of the legal staff for the 
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main office of the SS.50 In cases such as this, where the accused could not be linked to 
the commission of any specific offence, the doctrine still resembled a form of guilt by 
association and as a result remained one of the most controversial elements of the IMT.  
Despite its controversial nature, however, the concept of group liability based on a 
common purpose did prove to be a particularly effective prosecutorial strategy. It 
provided a solution for dealing with individuals who were decidedly guilty of 
participation in heinous offences but where requiring a high standard of proof was 
unrealistic given the collective nature of the crimes and the chaotic nature of armed 
conflict. For this reason, the essence of both conspiracy theory and the criminal 
organization doctrine were revived when the international community faced similar 
problems trying to convict individual war criminals of collective criminal atrocities 
committed in the former Yugoslavia.  
iii. Joint Criminal Enterprise 
The bloody dissolution of the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990’s was characterized 
by wide-spread atrocities, reminiscent of World War II. Both the scale and egregious 
nature of the crimes engendered global outrage and prompted a judicial response from 
the UN Security Council. Inspired by the IMT proceedings in Nuremberg, the Security 
Council adopted Resolution 827 in 1993 which created the ICTY “for the sole purpose 
of prosecuting persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian 
law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.”51 The first case that came 
before the ICTY was that of Du!ko Tadi".  
Tadi" was first indicted in 1995, charged with 34 individual counts of seizure, murder, 
maltreatment and other offences committed in 1992 against Bosniaks and Croats in 
op!tina Prijedor, an area in the northern part of the Republika Srpska in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.52 The ICTY Trial Chamber found Tadi" guilty on 11 counts of persecution 
and beatings, but more significantly they found him not guilty of 20 counts including 
five counts of murder.53  
Five of the murders that Tadi" had been accused of committing took place in the village 
of Jaskici. Tadi" was part of a group of armed Serbs who had entered the village, ordered 
the male villagers out of their homes and beat them severely. Five of the victims, who 
had been alive when the armed group entered Jaskici, were found shot to death after the 
group’s departure.54 While the Trial Chamber had accepted that Tadi" was clearly a 
member of the group that had entered the village, they concluded that as to the murders 
“[the Chamber] cannot be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had any 
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part in the killing of the five men or any of them... Nothing is known as to who shot 
them or in what circumstances.”55 The Prosecutor appealed the decision alleging that the 
Trial Chamber had erred in concluding that there was insufficient evidence to convict 
Tadi" of the five murders in Jaskici and claimed the Chamber had misdirected itself on 
the application of the common purpose doctrine.56  
In their submissions, the Office of the Prosecutor put forward an interpretation of the 
common purpose doctrine that closely resembles both conspiracy theory (particularly the 
Pinkerton doctrine) and the criminal organization doctrine. The Prosecutor suggested 
that, “if a person knowingly participates in a criminal activity with others, he or she will 
be liable for all illegal acts that are natural and probable consequences of that common 
purpose.”57 According to the Prosecutor, the accused had participated in an attack and 
the central policy of the attack had been “to rid the region of the non-Serb population by 
committing inhumane and violent acts against them in order to achieve the creation of a 
Greater Serbia.”58 Based on this, it was submitted that the five murders were an entirely 
predictable consequence of the central policy and that the accused’s actions during the 
attack on Jaskici had directly and substantially assisted in that policy such that regardless 
of which member of the Serb forces had actually killed the five victims—the accused 
should be held accountable under Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute.59 
The Appeal Chamber not only agreed with the Prosecutor that the five murders were 
attributable to Tadi" under a version of the common purpose doctrine, but they further 
expanded this concept into an even broader form of individual criminal responsibility 
derived from a new theory of group liability known as Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE).  
To convict an individual under JCE, the Prosecutor must establish three elements to form 
the conduct requirement above and beyond the actus reus required for the specific 
offence. First, there must be a plurality of persons.60 This requirement can be satisfied 
relatively informally and does not necessitate the strict structural requirements that were 
articulated by the IMT for criminal organizations. In support of this informal approach, 
the Appeal Chamber pointed to a case from World War II, the Borkum Island case, in 
which an American air crew had been stranded on the German island of Borkum. The 
crew members were first beaten by members of the Reich’s Labour Corps and then 
beaten by civilians on the street as they were marched to the city hall while the mayor 
reportedly incited citizens to kill the Americans “like dogs”.61 The mob that beat and 
eventually killed the crew members displayed none of the organizational markings that 
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were required by the IMT, however in quoting the prosecutor in the Borkum Island case 
the Appeal Chamber states that “all legal authorities agree that where a common design 
of a mob exists and the mob has carried out its purpose, then no distinction can be drawn 
between the finger man and the trigger man (sic).”62 
The second conduct requirement for JCE is the existence of a common plan, design or 
purpose which involves the commission of a crime. Similar to the “plurality of persons” 
requirement, this too can be satisfied rather informally. According to the Appeal 
Chamber, the common plan, design or purpose does not need to have been arranged 
beforehand, but “may materialise extemporaneously and be inferred from the fact that a 
plurality of persons… [act] in unison to put into effect a joint criminal enterprise.” 63 In 
order for a member of the JCE to inherit guilt from another member, the member 
committing the specific offence needs to have acted in pursuance of the common 
purpose. For example, in Limaj et al.,64 a later case heard by the ICTY Appeal Chamber, 
three members of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) were alleged to have 
“systematically beat detainees, committing the crimes of cruel treatment and torture in 
[a] prison camp.”65 The prosecution argued that the KLA was a JCE and because of this 
the three were liable for their own crimes and crimes committed by others at the camp. 
Both the Trial Chamber and the Appeal Chamber dismissed the JCE charge because 
neither was convinced that the evidence had ruled out the possibility that the other 
crimes were committed by “outsiders” who had been acting for personal reasons rather 
than to affect the common purpose of the KLA.66  
The final conduct requirement for JCE is the accused’s actual participation in the 
common purpose of the plurality of persons. According to the Appeal Chamber, this 
participation does not need to be related to the commission of a specific crime, but can 
take the form of assistance in, or contribution to, the execution of the common purpose.67  
Each of the conduct requirements present procedural problems that create the potential 
for (and in many cases have in fact created) an overbroad theory of liability. Under the 
IMT’s theory of criminal organizations, one thing that prevented a flood of convictions 
for mere membership was the structural requirements placed on the organization. The 
group not only had to be organized for a common purpose, but the structure of the group 
had to be such that its volunteer membership would understand  they were participating 
in the common purpose. This suggests a much higher threshold than the JCE’s “plurality 
of persons”, which can apparently be satisfied by the random association of a mob.  
The lack of structural definition in the JCE common purpose requirement is equally 
problematic. Under conventional conspiracy theory, the criminal purpose must be agreed 
to in advance; a criminalized agreement is, after all, the essence of a conspiracy. The 
agreement requirement was somewhat negated under the criminal organization doctrine, 
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however the IMT still required an identifiable common purpose that could be known to 
all members of the collective by virtue of the group’s organization, and that was in fact 
pervasively held among the membership. Conversely, under the theory of JCE it appears 
that the “common purpose” may be imposed judicially ex post facto with no 
requirements for specificity. An innovative prosecutor may persuade a court that a 
plurality of persons are bound by their common purpose to take over the world—a broad 
and ambiguous threat from which just about any specific criminal act might be 
considered the natural and probable consequence of.    
Finally, little assistance can be found in JCE’s participation requirement. It is not 
necessary for the accused to have contributed to the commission of a specific crime, but 
only to have assisted or contributed to the common purpose of the plurality of persons in 
some way. The Appeal Chamber was clear that the accused’s participation does not need 
to be conditio sine qua non, which is an acceptable position under the doctrine of 
complicity; however, there is no indication as to what the threshold of participation 
might be. For other forms of complicity, the ICTY considered relevant the requirements 
set out in the 1996 Draft Code of Crimes which calls for a “direct and substantial” 
contribution, which would facilitate the commission of a crime (or execution of a 
common purpose) in “some significant way”.68 In Kvo#ka et al., the Trial Chamber 
echoed this requirement, holding that “an accused must have carried out acts that 
substantially assisted or significantly affected the furtherance of the goals of the 
enterprise, with the knowledge that his acts or omissions facilitated the crimes 
committed through the enterprise in order to be criminally liable as a participant in a 
joint criminal enterprise.”69 Unfortunately this did not stand for long and was overturned 
by the Appeal Chamber which held that in general, there is no specific legal requirement 
that the accused make a substantial contribution to a JCE.70 
With the conduct elements established, a prosecutor seeking a conviction of individual 
criminal responsibility by virtue of participation in a JCE would need to demonstrate that 
the accused met one of three possible fault requirements. The first possibility (JCE I) is 
best described as co-perpetration where all individuals acting pursuant to a common 
purpose possess the same criminal intention. Under JCE I, the accused must have 
voluntarily participated in at least one aspect of the common purpose and must have 
intended the specific crime, even if they did not personally affect the criminal result. The 
second possibility (JCE II) is characterised as “systematic”, and requires the existence of 
an organized system that is guided by a common criminal purpose. Conviction under 
JCE II requires the accused to have been aware of the nature of the “system” and to have 
intended to further its common concerted purpose. The final possibility (JCE III) is 
considered the extended form of JCE and is most similar to the IMT’s criminal 
organization doctrine. Under JCE III, if an individual participates in the common 
criminal purpose of a group they can be held responsible as a member of the JCE for 
crimes other than those envisaged by the common purpose. According to the Appeal 
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Chamber, JCE III has two key elements: “(i) the intent to take part in a joint criminal 
enterprise and to further—individually and jointly—the criminal purposes of that 
enterprise; and (ii) the foreseeability of the possible commission by other members of 
the group of offences that do not constitute the object of the common criminal 
purpose.”71  
As might be expected, JCE III is the most controversial theory of group liability 
developed by the ICTY. While the criminal organization doctrine and conspiracy theory 
placed a high threshold on the conduct requirement and a lower threshold on the fault 
requirement, JCE I and II take a reverse approach. As mentioned above, the conduct 
requirements for JCE I and II are minimal, both in terms of the group’s structure and 
loosely defined common purpose. However, the fault requirement for both requires full 
intent to either affect the criminal result or further a system of criminal behaviour. 
Conversely, JCE III has both a low conduct requirement and a low fault requirement. A 
prosecutor seeking a conviction under JCE III benefits from the same low structural 
requirements that apply to JCE I and II for the composition of the group, common 
purpose, and participation. The prosecutor also benefits from a low fault requirement 
similar to both conspiracy theory and the criminal organization doctrine. If it can be 
established that the accused intended to take part in the JCE, all that remains for the 
prosecutor to demonstrate is a level of culpability similar to recklessness or even 
negligence,  in that, the accused can be vicariously liable for crimes they did not commit, 
did not intend, did not have knowledge of, but that were “foreseeable” as part of an 
overall common criminal purpose. Where conspiracy law was considered the darling of 
the US prosecutor’s nursery, JCE has been called the nuclear bomb of the international 
prosecutor’s arsenal.72   
The doctrine of complicity and its various forms of derivative liability have taken root in 
most national legal systems. The application of these forms of indirect individual 
criminal responsibility are interpreted by domestic courts, shaped by diverse legal 
traditions, and defined in light of constitutional limitations. In theory the various 
approaches taken by different countries that apply the doctrine of complicity would 
inform the international approach which is meant to be representative of a more or less 
unified theory of criminal justice. However, given the collective nature of international 
crimes and the peculiar evidentiary challenges to establishing individual criminal 
responsibility, for better or worse the international tribunals have become an 
authoritative source for theories of derivative and group liability. Consequently, the 
highly controversial and highly criticized doctrines of conspiracy, criminal 
organizations, and JCE have outgrown the confines of IMT and ICTY jurisprudence and 
are poised to influence interpretations of complicity in both the Rome Statute and its 
implementing legislation in Canada.  
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II. CANADA AND COMPLICITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMES  
From the few sorted facts that have emerged regarding the Canadian transfer of 
detainees to Afghan authorities, it appears possible that war crimes were committed. It is 
alleged that Afghan authorities tortured the detainees that were surrendered to them by 
the Canadian Forces, and it is claimed that Canadian officials knew this offence was 
taking place. Where the alleged offence is a war crime, states that are a party to the 
Rome Statue have agreed to grant primacy to national jurisdictions under the principle of 
complementarity.73 According to this principle, a state whose nationals have been  the 
victim of a war crime, or have been accused of war crimes, has the authority to conduct 
an investigation and if necessary prosecute the offenders without interference from the 
ICC. Only if the circumstances indicate that the relevant state is unwilling or unable to 
carry out proceedings genuinely can the ICC exercise jurisdiction over the matter.  
In the case of the Afghan detainees, there are two potential offenders: i) the Afghan 
authorities who allegedly committed acts of torture, and ii) the Canadian officials who 
may have been complicit in the crimes of the Afghans. Afghanistan could claim 
jurisdiction over the first group of offenders, however it is likely that the Afghan 
government will be considered unwilling (or possibly unable) to carry out proceedings 
genuinely, and jurisdiction will be open to the ICC to investigate the accused Afghan 
authorities. The accused Canadian officials, on the other hand, may still face justice in 
Canada and may be prosecuted under the War Crimes Act.  
The War Crimes Act was enacted in 2000 and echoes many of the provisions set out in 
the Rome Statute. It criminalizes acts of genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes, both within and outside of Canada, including the torture of detainees during an 
armed conflict. Having been accused of directly torturing detainees, it is clear that the 
Afghan authorities would be at risk of prosecution under the War Crimes Act if they ever 
found themselves in Canada. The situation is less clear in the case of the accused 
Canadian officials since the allegations against them do not involve the direct 
commission of war crimes, but rather complicity. This poses a problem because it is not 
entirely clear to what extent complicity, a partially codified but still ambiguous common 
law doctrine, violates the War Crimes Act.   
a) Complicity under Canadian Criminal Law  
Complicity in Canadian criminal law began as a product of the common law, under 
which liability was divided into four categories:  
1) Principals in the first degree: those who committed an offence either 
directly or indirectly through an innocent agent. 
2) Principals in the second degree: those who aided in the commission of 
an offence at the scene of the offence (i.e. co-perpetrators).  
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3) Accessories before the fact: those who aided (facilitate) or incited 
(solicit) the commission of an offence but who are not present at the 
scene. 
4) Accessories after the fact: those who assisted in the escape or 
concealment of an offender or who receive stolen property.74 
Under the common law, this structure represented what is known as a differentiated 
model of participation in which descending degrees of criminal responsibility are 
attributed such that an accessory bears less liability than a principal for their contribution 
to a crime. The alternative to the differentiated model is the unitary model in which all 
participants to a crime are placed on the same standing, carry the same criminal 
responsibility, and may receive the same punishment.  
Although the differentiated model prevails in many of the world’s criminal justice 
systems, Canada cannot truly be counted among this group. The Canadian model of 
participation was inherited from the English criminal law reform project in the late 19th 
century, known as Stephen’s Code, in which the common law categories were merged 
and codified as party offences—with the exception of accessory after the fact which 
remained a distinct offence.75 The Canadian adoption of the English party offences has 
created a partially unitary model in that those who commit, aid, abet, or form a common 
intention can all be convicted of the same thing—being a party to an offence.76 The 
essence of the differentiated model is said to remain in the realm of sentencing, in that 
those who aid in the commission of a crime are not likely to receive the same 
punishment as those who commit it. This approach, however, could still be criticized  for 
running afoul of the fair labelling principle in criminal law because, although an 
accessory may face a lesser sentence, as a “party” equal to the principal they are still 
being convicted for acts that go beyond their personal contribution.    
Canadian criminal law is well developed and fairly settled in the area of party offences. 
The problems identified in the international complicity doctrines that have produced 
vague or unreasonable standards for accessorial fault and conduct are not generally an 
issue in Canada. The elements of aiding, abetting, and common intention have been 
defined in both the Criminal Code and in the jurisprudence, and where there has been 
potential for the fault and conduct requirements to imitate their unwieldy international 
counter-parts, constitutional guarantees for the rights of the accused have reined them in.         
The elements for each of the party offences are fairly simple to articulate, but each 
begins with the often overlooked requirement that a crime must have been committed by 
the principal. To be liable, the aider needs only to have provided assistance with the 
intention of helping the principal to commit the offence.77 Liability for aiding does not 
rest entirely on whether the accused’s conduct has the actual effect of assisting the 
principal, but rather on the intention of the accused to bring about the consequences of 
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the principal’s actions.78 The subjective fault requirement of intent can also be satisfied 
with actual knowledge or wilful blindness.79 To be liable as an abettor, the accused must 
say or do something that actually encourages the principal to commit the offence.80 
Similar to aiding, the act of abetting must be done with the intention of bringing about 
prohibited consequences; although intention can be satisfied by actual knowledge.81 
Compared to their international counter-parts, the Canadian accessory offences of aiding 
and abetting provide a relatively low conduct requirement but an extremely high fault 
requirement.   
Common intention is the Canadian version of international complicity doctrines such as 
conspiracy,82 criminal organizations and JCE. This form of complicity requires a group 
of individuals to have formed a common criminal intention, which according to the 
courts requires no more than having in mind the same unlawful purpose.83 An offence 
must then be committed by a member of the group which is different from the unlawful 
purpose, and which the accused did not aid, abet, or commit. To be liable, the accused 
must have known, or ought to have known, that the offence committed was a probable 
consequence of carrying out the unlawful purpose in common with the principal.84 The 
fault requirement for the accused generally requires only objective foresight unless the 
crime in question carries a particular societal stigma, which war crimes undoubtedly 
do.85 This means that if an individual was charged under the War Crimes Act based on 
common intention, the prosecution would need to establish subjective foresight. Similar 
to conspiracy and criminal organizations, common intention has a somewhat higher 
conduct requirement and a lower fault requirement.  
While Canadian law regarding party offences is generally straightforward and not 
particularly controversial, the application of this law to the War Crimes Act is 
complicated by the uncertain effect of international complicity doctrines. In theory, these 
doctrines should not be a live issue in Canada because, although the War Crimes Act 
implements the Rome Statute and is largely representative of its substantive provisions 
and underlying principles, the Canadian legislation was meant to create a unique 
criminal law regime wholly consistent with the rest of Canadian law. As Donald Piragoff 
of the Department of Justice said to the Standing Committee on Foreign Affair and 
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International Trade while the War Crimes Act was in development, “that’s one of the 
benefits of our system of ratification. We have to actually pass legislation if there are 
nuances or problems with respect to domestic law or constitutional law. Because we 
create new legislation to ratify, we’re able to rectify those kinds of problems when we 
come around to ratifying a treaty.”86 The creation of a unique Canadian approach to the 
prosecution of international crimes may have been the original intention of Parliament, 
but the judicial consideration that the War Crimes Act has received so far indicates the 
distinct presence of international complicity doctrines.  
b) Complicity and the War Crimes Act 
Under Section 6 of the War Crimes Act, individual criminal responsibility is attributable 
to anyone who commits, conspires to commit, attempts to commit, counsels in relation 
to, or is an accessory after the fact in relation to a war crime. Several modes of 
participation that would incur criminal responsibility under the Rome Statute are 
conspicuously absent from the express wording in the War Crimes Act, most relevant to 
the allegations against Canadian officials is the absence of aiding, abetting, and common 
intention. The absent complicity provisions in the War Crimes Act have a unique 
legislative history in that it is clear from the parliamentary debates that the government 
had specifically intended to criminalize these types of participation.87 As the Federal 
Court explained in Zazai No. 1,88 this objective has been obtained by reference. 
In Zazai No. 1, the applicant was a citizen of Afghanistan who came to Canada as a 
stowaway and made a refugee claim after he arrived at Montreal Harbour. The 
Convention Refugee Determination Division (CRDD) of the Immigration and Refugee 
Board determined that there were serious reasons for considering that Zazai had been 
complicit in crimes against humanity in Afghanistan and as a result he was considered 
inadmissible to Canada for violating the War Crimes Act. Zazai argued that while 
complicity in crimes against humanity may be criminalized in international law, it is not 
criminalized under the War Crimes Act. In response to this suggestion, the Court referred 
to the Interpretation Act89 and found that complicity was indeed criminalized under the 
War Crimes Act:  
…section 34[(2)] of the Interpretation Act … provides that where an 
enactment creates an offence, all the provisions of the Criminal Code 
relating to indictable offences apply to indictable offences created by the 
enactment. Thus, the partyship provisions that appear in the Criminal 
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Code—including the aiding and abetting provisions in section 21—apply 
to the War Crimes Act.90 
This conclusion would have been a reasonable place for judicial consideration of this 
question to stop, however, after ruling on Zazai No. 1 the Federal Court certified the 
following question of general importance: “Does the definition of ‘crime against 
humanity’ found at subsection 6(3) of the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes 
Act include complicity therein?”91 
Despite the fact that this question seemed to be resolved by the Interpretation Act, it was 
considered a second time by the Federal Court of Appeal in Zazai No. 2.92 In Zazai No. 
2, the Court did not consider the Interpretation Act but instead read “complicity” into the 
word “commits”. Section 6(1) of the War Crimes Act states:  
6. (1) Every person who… commits outside Canada 
(a) genocide, 
(b) a crime against humanity, or 
(c) a war crime, 
is guilty of an indictable offence    
According to the Court,  
At common law and under Canadian criminal law, [complicity] was, and 
still is, a mode of commission of a crime. It refers to the act or omission of 
a person that helps, or is done for the purpose of helping, the furtherance 
of a crime. An accomplice is then charged with, and tried for, the crime 
that was actually committed and that he assisted or furthered. In other 
words, whether one looks at it from the perspective of our domestic law or 
of international law, complicity contemplates a contribution to the 
commission of a crime.93 
The Court’s suggestion that complicity is a mode of commission instead of a mode of 
participation is problematic for two reasons. First, it poses a problem of statutory 
interpretation. Section 21(1) of the Criminal Code creates the category of “parties to 
offence” which states that everyone is a party to an offence who a) commits; b) aids; or 
c) abets. Therefore, aiding and abetting (forms of complicity) are not modes of 
commission but rather, along with commission, distinct modes of party offences. Had 
section 6(1) of the War Crimes Act stated that every person who is a party to genocide, 
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crimes against humanity, or war crimes is guilty of an indictable offence, then the use of 
“party” would have included commits, aids, and abets. However, the word “party” was 
not used and it is problematic to suggest that the same result can be attained through the 
word “commits”.  
The second and more fundamental problem stems from the Court’s justification for the 
proposition that complicity is inherently included in definitions of crimes against 
humanity. For this, the Court turned to international criminal law and specifically the 
ICTY’s articulation of JCE II in Kvo#ka et al.: 
Merely knowing that crimes are being committed within a system and 
knowingly participating in that system in a way that substantially assists or 
facilitates the commission of a crime or which allows the criminal 
enterprise to function effectively or efficiently would be enough to 
establish criminal liability. The aider or abettor or co-perpetrator of a joint 
criminal enterprise contributes to the commission of the crimes by playing 
a role that allows the system or enterprise to continue its functioning.94 
Turning to the ICTY’s concept of JCE for support of a charge of complicity under the 
Canadian War Crimes Act is itself problematic for two reasons. First, the Court 
highlighted the fact that the ICTY said aiders and abettors contribute to the commission 
of a crime by participating in a criminal system. The Court supposedly saw this as 
support for the proposition that aiding and abetting are modes of commission. 
Notwithstanding the fact that this is not what the ICTY said (they instead were 
identifying the conduct requirement for aiders and abettors in JCE II), there would have 
been no reason for the ICTY to suggest that aiding and abetting were modes of 
commission because the ICTY Statute clearly distinguished between “aids”, “abets” and 
“commits”, and attributed individual criminal responsibility to all three.   
The second problem is that the JCE doctrine is itself highly controversial and, in fact, 
several scholars have suggested that the ICTY actually exceeded its jurisdiction by 
creating it.95 Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statue attributed individual criminal responsibility 
to anyone who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in 
the planning, preparation or execution of a crime. Article 7(1) did not attribute individual 
criminal responsibility for a joint criminal enterprise, a common design or plan, or 
expanded forms of conspiracy. This posed a problem for the ICTY Appeal Chamber 
when it was considering how to impute liability to Tadi" for the five murders in Jaskici. 
There was not enough evidence to support a conviction of any of the modes of 
participation expressly provided for in Article 7(1), so the Appeal Chamber turned to the 
“object and purpose” of the Statute as set out in Article 1 to justify a more expansive 
reading of Article 7.96 The Appeal Chamber reasoned that a narrow reading of Article 7 
would allow too many perpetrators to escape the reach of international criminal justice 
and that this would run contrary to the intentions of the Security Council in creating the 
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ICTY. Based on this, they believed that the only reasonable reading of Article 7 must 
include a sufficiently liberal doctrine of conspiracy that would allow prosecution for 
offenders that might otherwise be acquitted. As Jens David Ohlin of Columbia 
University explains in his article Three Conceptual Problems with the Doctrine of Joint 
Criminal Enterprise, “the structure of the argument suggests that we can work 
backwards from the proposition that the defendants must be punished. Since the 
defendants must be punished, the statute must be read in such a way that it will yield the 
desired result.”97  
Given the scope and nature of the crimes that the ICTY was forced to deal with, the 
evidentiary challenges they faced and the novelty of their procedure, it may be 
reasonable to forgive some of their conceptual failings. However, the Canadian Federal 
Court of Appeal is not the ICTY. It does not operate under the same somewhat illusive 
rules of international criminal law, and it is not faced with the daunting task of 
prosecuting those most responsible for the most serious crimes committed during a 
particularly bloody and complex armed conflict. Some consider the ICTY’s mandate to 
be broad enough to provide it with some conceptual space for prosecutorial innovation. 
The Canadian Federal Court of Appeal does not share that mandate, so there should be 
no justification to import the type of conviction-oriented reasoning that gave birth to 
JCE.   
The findings from Canadian courts to date indicate that the party offences listed in the 
Criminal Code apply the War Crimes Act by virtue of section 34(2) of the Interpretation 
Act. However, this clear articulation of the law has become clouded by unnecessary 
references to international criminal law’s broad theories of derivative liability.98 The 
result of this cross-pollination in the doctrine of complicity  has been a lack of clarity. 
Unfortunately, further judicial consideration (not of whether complicity is a war crime 
but of what constitutes complicity in war crimes) has not resolved these ambiguities. 
Instead, the jurisprudence raises the question of to what extent Canadian criminal law 
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has been displaced by international criminal law where the subject matter is complicity 
in war crimes. 
III. THE ROME STATUTE 
Even though a consideration of the Afghan detainee issue under the Canadian War 
Crimes Act would likely satisfy the complementarity requirement under the Rome 
Statute, there still remains the assertion made by Michael Byers and William Schabas 
that this is a matter for the ICC. Without addressing the issue of jurisdiction under the 
principle of complementarity, it is worthwhile to consider how relevant provisions in the 
Rome Statute might apply to the allegations that have been made against Canadian 
officials.   
As previously mentioned, the Rome Statute, like the War Crimes Act, criminalizes acts 
of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes—which includes the torture of 
detainees during an armed conflict. Article 25(3) of the Statute contains detailed 
provisions regarding criminalized modes of participation that will result in individual 
criminal responsibility. These include: commission, joint commission, commission 
through another, ordering, solicitation, inducement, aiding, abetting, or “otherwise 
assisting”, contribution to a common purpose, inciting genocide, and attempts.  
Given the relative youth of the Rome Statute, it is not yet clear if the highly structured 
model of participation in Article 25(3) was intended to be unitary or differentiated. Some 
have suggested that the highly structured nature of Article 25(3) itself indicates a 
differentiated model—why else would the drafters have gone to such lengths to divide 
the various modes of participation into distinct subsections? In addition, it is argued that 
since the differentiated model prevails in many of the world’s main legal systems, it is 
logical to assume that an international legal regime would reflect this common 
practice.99 Conversely, it is argued that while the Rome Statute does draw a distinction 
between different modes of participation, there is no evidence in the Statute to suggest 
that one mode was meant to be less blameworthy than any other. There is no indication 
that less responsibility should be attributed to accessorial modes as opposed to principal 
modes, and more significantly there is no indication that different levels of punishment 
should be applied. It has also been suggested that since many of the modes of 
participation overlap, it would be illogical to assume a differentiated model applies since 
this would render some of the subsections either redundant or contradictory.100 For 
example, joint commission, commission through another, and ordering are all principal 
modes of participation that would be caught under the umbrella of “commits”. If Article 
25(3) was a differentiated model of participation then someone who orders a crime 
would be attributed less responsibility than someone who commits a crime through 
another person, despite the fact that both are principal forms of commission. Based on 
this, it is more likely that Article 25(3) represents a unitary model that simply provides 
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the court with various modes of participation to choose from when trying to determine if 
the conduct requirement of a crime has been satisfied. Under a unitary model, these 
modes would only describe the nature of the participation in the conduct alleged and not 
necessarily the gravity of applicable penalties.101    
If it is assumed that the Rome Statute applies a unitary model of participation, then the 
cost of prosecuting Canadian officials for complicity in war crimes increases 
dramatically. It must be remembered that under a unitary model the accessory and the 
principal carry the same amount of criminal responsibility for the offence, meaning that 
by being complicit the Canadian officials would not be convicted of being an accessory 
to torture, but would be guilty of the war crime itself. According to Byers and Schabas, 
this proposition could become a reality under Article 25(3)(c) or (d).   
a) Article 25(3)(c) 
Article 25(3)(c) of the Rome Statute states that criminal responsibility will be incurred if 
one:   
For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, abets 
or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commission, 
including providing the means for its commission. 
The international concept of aiding and abetting is not substantially different from the 
Canadian concept. Aiding has been described as providing assistance to the principal; 
abetting has been described as encouraging the principal or granting moral support. 
Neither aiding or abetting require an accessory’s contribution to the base offence be 
conditio sine qua non.102 In general the term “aiding and abetting” tends to be used as a 
catch all phrase that represents the weakest form of complicity in Article 25(3) and 
includes any contribution to a crime that is not caught by the preceding subsections.103 
The difficulty in interpreting the conduct requirement imposed by Article 25(3)(c) 
concerns the necessary relationship between the contribution and the commission of the 
crime.  
In Canadian law, the contribution of aiders does not need to actually assist the 
principal’s commission of a crime, so long as the accused had intended to provide 
assistance. In the case of abettors, the act of encouraging the principal to commit a crime 
must actually provide encouragement. Presumably if the principal is completely 
unaffected by the encouragement, a charge of abetting will not stand (although an 
accused may be charged in the alternative with (e.g.) counselling). International law 
seems less concerned with differentiating between the conduct of an “aider” versus that 
of an “abettor”, and instead focuses on the effect of the “contribution”. The formal 
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standard for the contribution seems to oscillate between “direct and substantial” and 
merely “substantial”. As mentioned previously, the 1996 Draft Code of Crimes required 
that the contribution of aiding and abetting be “direct and substantial”, i.e., it must 
facilitate the commission of a crime in some significant way.104 This standard was 
adopted by the ICTY Trial Chamber in Tadi", even though the Chamber did not seem to 
take this requirement very seriously since it included in the concept of aiding and 
abetting “all acts of assistance by words or acts that lend encouragement or support”.105 
The qualifier of “direct” was dropped in Furund$ija, a later ICTY case, which stated that 
the use of the term was misleading “as it may imply that assistance needs to be tangible, 
or to have a causal effect on the crime.” 106 Requiring a causal link may actually have 
been the objective of the Draft Code provision’s use of the term “direct”, but 
nevertheless it was abandoned by subsequent ICTY jurisprudence leaving only 
“substantial”—which may now only set the bar as high as “all acts of assistance”, 
significant or otherwise.       
Despite the fact that “substantial” was the standard settled upon at the ICTY (even 
without “direct” and notwithstanding the diminishing definition of “substantial”), the 
ICC is not bound by the decisions of the ICTY. Yet, the jurisprudence that emerged from 
the ICTY has been considered to reflect the current state of customary law in many 
regards,  and its precedents are considered persuasive in numerous jurisdictions. 
Therefore, decisions from the ICTY have been and will probably continue to be 
considered by the ICC. However, the ICC is free to depart from standards set by the 
ICTY, particularly in relation to provisions set out in the Rome Statute that indicate a 
departure was intended. Article 25(3)(c) does not specifically adopt the “substantial” 
requirement, meaning that it is still for the ICC to decide whether the threshold for the 
contribution of the accused relative to the offence committed should be higher or lower 
than that articulated by the ICTY.  
Just as the ICTY’s conduct requirement for aiding and abetting oscillated between 
“direct and substantial” and “substantial” or “all acts of assistance”, the fault 
requirement oscillated between “intent” and “knowledge”. In Ori", the Trial Chamber 
suggested that for a charge of aiding and abetting an accused must have “double intent” 
in that they must intend the furthering effects of their contribution, and they must intend 
completion of the crime committed by the principal.107 In Tadi", the Appeal Chamber 
held that aiding and abetting only required knowledge that the acts performed by the 
accused would assist in the commission of a specific crime by the principal.108 In 
Furund$ija, the Trial Chamber agreed that knowledge was the correct standard, but held 
that the accused did not need to have knowledge of the precise crime committed by the 
principal.109 In Simi" et al., the Appeal Chamber combined the rulings from Tadi" and 
Furund$ija holding that an accused must have had knowledge that their acts would assist 
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in the commission of a specific crime, but did not have to have been aware of the precise 
crime that the principal intended or committed.110 To further complicate things, Article 
25(3)(c) sets it own distinct fault requirement, “purpose”. By setting its own standard, it 
would be logical to assume that the Rome Statute has shut out ICTY jurisprudence on 
this matter. Conversely, since “purpose” is not defined in the Statute, the ICTY 
jurisprudence may yet prove relevant as the ICC attempts to develop a definition.    
The use of “purpose” in Article 25(3)(c) implies a discrete fault requirement for aiding 
and abetting that must be separate from the fault requirement which applies to the Rome 
Statute generally under Article 30. Article 30 provides that, unless otherwise stated, the 
fault requirement for offences is intent and knowledge. Intent is defined as meaning to 
engage in the conduct and cause certain consequences. Knowledge is defined as being 
aware that a circumstance exists or that a consequence will occur in the ordinary course 
of events. The question that arises from this is: what can “purpose” mean that is different 
from Article 30? 
Some commentators have explained that the difference between Article 30 and 
“purpose” relates to the scope of the required intent in terms of what particular 
consequence the accused sought to achieve; “purpose”, it is argued, signifies the need for 
specific intent.111 This interpretation would be similar to the one advocated by the Trial 
Chamber in Ori" which called for a “double intent” for aiders and abettors. It would also 
be consistent with judicial interpretations of the American Model Penal Code, from 
which the language of Article 25(3)(c) is borrowed. In determining when so-called 
accomplice liability will attach, American courts have held that an accomplice must 
share the purpose of the principal to commit the substantive offence charged, and have 
personally foreseen and intended the consequences of their acts.112 Contrary to this, other 
commentators have suggested that while “purpose” does indicate a fault requirement 
stricter than mere knowledge, it is still a standard less than intent. They suggest, for 
example, that the accused is only required to have knowledge of the principal’s intent, 
specific or otherwise depending on the crime.113  
In general, regardless of the varying interpretations, Article 25(3)(c) seems to set a 
relatively low conduct requirement bolstered by a higher (yet fleeting) fault requirement. 
An accused charged with participation in an international crime under Article 25(3)(c)  
must have contributed to the commission of an offence (through acts of assistance or 
encouragement) in some “substantial” way (or any way at all), and have done so for the 
“purpose” of facilitating the crime—which may mean sharing the specific intent of the 
principal, or simply knowing about the principal’s intent, accompanied by knowledge of 
the fact that the contributing acts will further the commission of the (general or specific) 
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crime. The ambiguity of the deceptively simple language in Article 25(3)(c) is only 
surpassed by that of Article 25(3)(d).  
b) Article 25(3)(d) 
Article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute states that criminal responsibility will be incurred if 
one:   
In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted 
commission of such a crime by a group of persons acting with a 
common purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and shall either: 
(i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or 
criminal purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose 
involves the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of 
the Court; or 
(ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to 
commit the crime. 
The use of the familiar phrase “common purpose” suggests that this provision is the 
Rome Statute’s version of the international complicity doctrines of conspiracy, criminal 
organizations and JCE. Even the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber held in Lubanga that the 
concept defined in Article 25(3)(d) is “closely akin to the concept of joint criminal 
enterprise or the common purpose doctrine adopted by the jurisprudence of the 
ICTY.”114 Given the vagueness, breadth, and malleability of the various international 
complicity doctrines it is curious that the drafters would have intended to replicate these 
theories of liability and yet would have done so without more precision. Some 
commentators have suggested that the reason for this was because of the divisive nature 
of concepts such as conspiracy and JCE which led to heated debates regarding their 
express inclusion at the Rome Conference. The solution was to borrow the wording from 
a provision of the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings 
which had been adopted by consensus in 1998.115 While this approach may have 
provided a diplomatic resolution to a controversial issue, the provision was transplanted 
without the critical context provided by the 1998 Convention for the interpretation of the 
common purpose doctrine.116 This oversight has resulted in a lack of clarity in the Rome 
Statute.   
The conduct requirement of Article 25(3)(d) contains two elements: i) any contribution 
to the commission or attempted commission of a crime by ii) a group of persons acting 
with a common purpose. In the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber’s own words, the character of the 
contribution is simply a “residual form… which makes it possible to criminalize those 
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contributions to a crime which cannot be characterized as ordering, soliciting, inducing, 
aiding, abetting or assisting.”117 Unlike aiding and abetting which typically require the 
accused’s act to form a “substantial” contribution to the principal’s crime (although the 
ICC may still find otherwise), the necessary relationship between the contribution and 
the offence committed under Article 25(3)(d) is less clear. However, given the fact that 
Article 25(3)(c) probably includes all accessorial contributions that are “substantial”, and 
Article 25(3)(d) includes “any other” contributions (i.e., those that are insubstantial), it is 
likely that the threshold is extremely low.  
The low conduct requirement is reminiscent of the criminal organizations doctrine and 
JCE II and III, but can be differentiated from the concept of conspiracy in that a 
contribution to the commission or attempted commission of a crime is actually required 
and an actual agreement between the accused and the principal is not. The phrase “group 
of persons acting with a common purpose” is also similar to the JCE III group 
requirement as it does not indicate the need for a formally organized entity that would 
meet the type of structural requirements articulated by the IMT. Presumably, this 
requirement could be satisfied by the formation of an ad hoc mob such as the one found 
responsible for killing the American air crew in the Borkum Island case. Ideally, the low 
conduct requirement would be offset by a higher fault requirement to ensure that only 
those who are truly criminally responsible are prosecuted. The provision’s reference to 
“intentional”, “aim”, and “knowledge”  seem promising in this regard but, as with aiding 
and abetting, this once high standard may be fleeting.  
Similar to the conduct requirement, the fault requirement has two elements: the 
accused’s contribution shall be 1) intentional, and shall be 2) (i) made with the aim of 
furthering the purpose of the group or (ii) made with knowledge of the intention of the 
group. From within a single domestic legal system, the standard of intent is easily 
defined by reference to a particular state’s statutory definitions and jurisprudence. 
Within the ICC various concepts of intent have collided, despite the best efforts of the 
drafters to define the term within the Rome Statute. As previously mentioned, Article 30 
defines intent as meaning to engage in specific conduct and cause certain consequences. 
From a common law perspective, intent is a distinct fault requirement that may be 
inferred from personal knowledge, could be imputed from wilful blindness, but can 
never be satisfied by recklessness or negligence. The civil law tradition, on the other 
hand, knows only two standards for fault: dolus (intent) and culpa (negligence).118 The 
definition of intent under the Rome Statute is not precise enough to preclude the common 
law or civil law approach, and so interpretation of the default fault standard could go 
either way.   
The uncertainty regarding intent was recently addressed by the Pre-Trial Chamber in 
Lubanga, where the Chamber found that the volitional element required by Article 30 
included the three types of dolus regularly found in civil law systems:  
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1) situations in which the suspect (i) knows that his or her actions or 
omissions will bring about the objective elements of the crime, and 
(ii) undertakes such actions or omissions with the concrete intent to 
bring about the objective elements of the crime (also known as dolus 
directus of the first degree)…  
2) situations in which the suspect, without having the concrete intent to 
bring about the objective elements of the crime, is aware that such 
elements will be the necessary outcome of his or her actions or 
omissions (also known as dolus directus of the second degree); and 
3) situations in which the suspect (i) is aware of the risk that the 
objective elements of the crime may result from his or her actions or 
omissions, and (ii) accepts such an outcome by reconciling himself or 
herself with it or consenting to it (also known as dolus eventualis).119 
This finding of the Chamber that “intent” includes all three dolus, including dolus 
eventualis, has the effect of lowering the intent requirement in the Rome Statute to 
recklessness. For the purposes of Article 25(3)(d), this means that an accused’s 
“intentional” contribution to a group crime could be satisfied by recklessness. 
The second element of the fault requirement under Article 25(3)(d) provides two 
alternatives. An accused can either act with the aim of furthering a group’s common 
purpose, or simply be aware of the group’s intentions. The first possibility is not 
particularly controversial—an intentional (or reckless) contribution made in knowing 
support of a common criminal purpose. This requirement could correspond to JCE I or II 
and is similar to the voluntary and knowing membership requirement of the criminal 
organizations doctrine (despite the contribution requirement being higher and the 
structural requirements of the group being lower). The second possibility raises more 
questions given its uncanny resemblance to JCE III’s extended theory of liability.  
The second possibility requires only knowledge of, but not support for, the group’s 
intention to commit the crime. A key question raised by this is what exactly does the 
accused need to have knowledge of? Is it the group’s common criminal purpose, the 
intention to commit the specific (or general) crime, or both? Do the Pre-Trial Chamber’s 
three types of dolus also apply to the intentions of the group? If they do, then the group’s 
“intentions” may actually read as the group’s “recklessness”. This would mean that an 
accused would only need to be aware that a group of persons acting under a common 
purpose was reckless, and that their own reckless contribution supported this reckless 
conduct. If this interpretation is valid, a form of liability even broader than JCE III could 
be created within the Rome Statute; JCE III at least requires participation in the group 
with intent to further the common purpose.  
Even if a higher standard is adopted—one that requires  the accused to have intentionally 
and knowingly contributed to a crime committed by a group whose common purpose 
they were aware of but did not support—the result can still be quite unjust. In his paper 
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Three Conceptual Problems with the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise, Jens David 
Ohlin of Columbia University explains what type of broad and ostensibly blameless 
conduct could be caught under Article 25(3)(d)(ii):  
Many members of the community may provide contributions to a criminal 
organization despite the fact that they disapprove of the group’s 
criminality. Merchants sell food, water and clothing to criminals; they sell 
cars and gasoline and repair their vehicles; they rent them office space, 
apartments and houses. These services are no doubt contributions to 
criminal organizations, since, without them, a conspiracy could not 
continue. Furthermore, these services may well be performed knowing of 
a gang’s criminal goals.120 
These seemingly innocuous contributions, made by a possibly oppressed community, 
would be enough to incur criminal responsibility under Article 25(3)(d)(ii) for whatever 
atrocities the criminal organization perpetrated.  
Unfortunately, Article 25(3)(d)(ii) is unlike the other international complicity doctrines 
in that it is not a product of case law but rather is codified in the Rome Statute. This 
means that the ICC will not have the freedom to adjust the limits on the group 
criminality provision the way the ICTY could have reined in the concept of JCE. 
However, one way to prevent an unnecessary broadening  of Article 25(3)(d)(ii) would 
be to impose an interpretation that required: i) the accused’s intentional contribution 
include both voluntariness and an intent for the contribution to have a furthering effect; 
and ii) the accused’s personal knowledge include awareness of the group’s common 
purpose and awareness of the group’s intention to commit a specific offence.  
Article 25(3)(c) and (d) describe complex and dynamic modes of accessory participation 
that appear to capture a broader range of conduct then the Canadian War Crimes Act. 
The broader nature of these provisions may be why Byers and Schabas named the ICC 
as their preferred forum within which to prosecute the accused Canadian officials. 
However, it remains to be seen whether this somewhat ambiguous legal framework will 
raise the prospect of a conviction for war crimes when it is applied to the case of the 
Afghan detainees.  
IV. CANADIAN COMPLICITY IN AFGHANISTAN: THE CASE TO BE MET 
After more than two years of speculation and allegations regarding torture, complicity in 
war crimes, and supposed government suppression, the House of Commons Special 
Committee on the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan commenced its study of the transfer 
of Afghan detainees from the Canadian Forces to Afghan authorities in October 2009.121 
Since then, only a few uncontroversial facts have emerged.     
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In August 2005, the Canadian Forces assumed control of the PRT in Kandahar City. In 
December 2005, the (then) Chief of Defence Staff Gen. Rick Hillier signed a 
memorandum of understanding with the Afghan Minister of Defence entitled 
“Arrangement for the Transfer of Detainees between the Canadian Forces and the 
Ministry of Defence of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan”. Under this agreement the 
post-transfer monitoring of detainees would be carried out by the ICRC and the Afghan 
Independent Human Rights Commission. In May 2007, Canada and the government of 
Afghanistan concluded a second memorandum of understanding regarding the transfer of 
detainees. Under the new agreement, Canadian government personnel were given access 
to detainees transferred from Canadian to Afghan custody. In November 2007, the 
Canadian Forces suspended detainee transfers as a result of a “credible allegation of 
mistreatment”.122 
It is alleged that the Afghan authorities who received the detainees, directly or indirectly, 
tortured them and subjected them to other forms of ill-treatment. It is further alleged that 
Canadian officials were aware of these abuses and continued to transfer detainees 
regardless. It has even been suggested that Canada may have intended some of the 
detainees to be tortured as a form of “enhanced” interrogation and benefited from this 
practice by receiving intelligence after the fact from Afghan authorities.123     
The Canadian government is currently at the beginning of a process of investigation that 
may take months if not years to complete. Until the government is able to conclude a full 
inquiry into the transfer of Afghan detainees from the Canadian Forces to Afghan 
authorities, exactly what occurred between December 2005, when transfers began, and 
November 2007, when transfers were suspended, will remain a mystery. Without a clear 
determination of the facts it is impossible to consider if a crime has been committed and, 
if so, who the responsible parties might be. A different question, however, that would be 
suitable for consideration at this time is: how does the law apply in this case? While it 
may not be possible (or desirable) to speculate on the outcome of any potential criminal 
proceedings, it is worthwhile to consider what the prosecution would have the burden of 
establishing if this matter ever came before a Canadian or international court.  
a) Canadian Criminal Proceedings under the War Crimes Act 
As a party to the Rome Statute, Canada has assumed jurisdiction over crimes of 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes through its enactment of the War 
Crimes Act. This legislation provides Canadian courts with the competency to decide on 
matters of international criminal law such as the alleged abuse of prisoners during an 
armed conflict outside of Canadian territory, in accordance with the international law of 
criminal jurisdiction. Under the Rome Statute’s complementarity principle, national 
judicial systems that are legislatively and institutionally capable of trying individuals for 
international crimes are granted primacy over the matter, unless or until they prove 
unwilling to carry out proceedings genuinely. In this regard, Canadian courts are, at least 
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for now, the correct forum in which to hear allegations of war crimes in relation to the 
transfer of detainees from the Canadian Forces to Afghan authorities.   
As mentioned previously, section 6(1) of the War Crimes Act declares that every person 
who commits a war crime outside of Canada is guilty of an indictable offence. A 
schedule to the War Crimes Act replicates article 8(2) of the Rome Statute which defines 
war crimes and includes within the definition the following provision:  
(c) in the case of an armed conflict not of an international character… 
any of the following acts committed against persons taking no active 
part in the hostilities, including… those placed hors de combat by… 
detention…:     
(i) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, 
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture.  
It is this particular war crime that Canada and other members of the International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan are accused of participating in. Their 
accusers claim that ISAF members have transferred detainees to Afghan authorities who 
are subsequently accused of torture, ill-treatment, and arbitrary detention by the Afghan 
National Directorate of Security (NDS).124 It is claimed that by transferring individuals 
to a situation where there is a grave risk of torture and other ill-treatment, ISAF members 
were complicit and in breach of their international legal obligations. It is worth nothing 
that even Canada’s most vehement accusers only accuse Canadian officials of being 
complicit in war crimes, or of being a party to the offence. Canadians are not alleged to 
have personally committed acts of torture or ill-treatment, but rather to have facilitated 
such acts. This claim of accessory liability engages the party offences in the Criminal 
Code, by virtue of section 34(2) of the Interpretation Act. 
Under the Criminal Code, an individual could be attributed derivative liability for a 
violation of the War Crimes Act by: aiding, abetting, through common intention, 
counselling, or by being an accessory after the fact.125 Since Canadian officials have 
been accused of “[choosing] to allow detainees to be transferred to the custody of 
Afghan authorities despite an apparent risk of torture and … [choosing] not to take 
reasonable and readily apparent steps to protect detainees”,126 it does not appear the 
grounds of abetting, counselling, or acting as an accessory after the fact would apply. No 
one has suggested that Canadians encouraged, procured, solicited, or incited Afghan 
authorities to commit acts of torture, nor has it been suggested that Canada enabled any 
of the Afghan perpetrators to escape prosecution. It could be argued that, based on prior 
judicial consideration of the War Crimes Act, there is precedence to consider criminal 
responsibility based on the international complicity doctrines. Although these doctrines 
have managed to permeate certain aspects of immigration law as illustrated by Zazai No. 
1 and 2, it is likely their overbroad nature would be found unconstitutional within a 
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criminal context. Therefore, the only remaining grounds of accessory participation which 
might apply in this case are aiding, and common intention. 
As derivative forms of liability, both aiding and common intention require someone 
other than the accused to have committed an offence before criminal responsibility for 
that offence can be imputed to the accused as a party. While section 23.1 of the Criminal 
Code states that an individual can be convicted as a party notwithstanding the fact that 
the principal has not or cannot be convicted, the principal still has to have committed the 
crime; they must be factually liable even if they are never found legally liable. In this 
case, the unnamed Afghan authorities must have committed acts of “violence to life and 
person” against the detainees they received from Canadian officials regardless of the fact 
they may never be prosecuted. Most of Canada’s accusers have taken it as a given that 
any individual transferred to Afghan custody was likely mistreated. They base this 
assumption on widespread reports from credible agencies which claim that this is a 
common practice in Afghan detention centres, particularly those operated by the NDS. 
However, individuals cannot be convicted of a crime that “likely” happened; a criminal 
charge can only stand if the evidence indicates a specific offence did happen and the 
accused was a party to it.         
Locating specific instances where an individual who was tortured by Afghan authorities 
can be identified as having come through Canadian custody may prove more difficult 
than the widespread reports of abuse suggest. The first problem is the uncertainty 
regarding how many individuals were actually detained by Canadian Forces and 
subsequently transferred to Afghan authorities—claims range from 40 to more than 
352.127 The second problem arises in trying to locate those individuals who were 
transferred and are now (or are no longer) in Afghan detention. In April 2007, the Globe 
and Mail published an article which claimed that 30 interviews were conducted with 
men who had been captured by the Canadian Forces, transferred to Afghan custody, and 
tortured.128 Conversely, when Richard Colvin, a senior representative from the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade at the PRT in Kandahar during 
the period of interest, testified before the Special Committee he admitted that when he 
and his colleagues tried to locate Afghans who had been transferred prior to the signing 
of the second transfer agreement “our records were so poor that the task was physically 
impossible.”129  
Even if evidence could not be adduced that specifically links a victim of torture to the 
Canadian Forces, and as a result it cannot be established that the offence in question has 
actually been committed, Canadian officials could potentially still face charges of 
conspiracy. Some have suggested that Canada may have intentionally transferred 
detainees to the NDS so that the NDS might utilize “enhanced” interrogation methods 
and gather intelligence which they would then share with Canada. Under a charge of 
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conspiracy, the prosecution would only need to establish that such an agreement existed 
and not that specific acts of torture ever took place.  
Assuming evidence of a specific instance of torture can be produced, the prosecution 
would need to establish that the Canadian officials responsible for the transfer of a 
tortured detainee met the conduct and fault requirements for aiding or common intention. 
To meet the requirements of aiding, the accused Canadian officials must have 
intentionally provided assistance to the principal, i.e., the Afghan authorities. The 
conduct threshold for this contribution is low and  need not have actually achieved the 
effect of assisting the principal. The Canadian contribution more than meets this 
requirement since the act of supplying the victims would not only have assisted the 
Afghans in committing acts of torture but would have been “direct and substantial”. In 
addition to this, to meet the fault requirement the Canadian officials must have intended 
to bring about the consequences of the Afghans’ actions. This is the crucial element that 
the evidence must show. Essentially, did the Canadian officials intend the detainees to be 
tortured by the Afghans? The intent of aiders can also be inferred from actual knowledge 
or wilful blindness, meaning that in the alternative one could ask: did the Canadian 
officials have actual knowledge of or were they wilfully blind to the fact that the 
Afghans would (not may) torture the detainees? This is a high subjective standard that 
cannot be satisfied by evidence of recklessness or negligence, and is something which 
only the yet unknown facts will be able to speak to.  
If the high threshold fault requirement prohibits prosecution of Canadian officials as 
aiders, prosecution for common intention is still a possibility. This form of party offence 
would require the Canadians to have formed a common intention with the Afghans to 
carry out some unlawful purpose. As a result of this, criminal responsibility for any 
subjectively foreseeable acts committed by the Afghans in furtherance of this unlawful 
purpose can be imputed to the Canadians. It would likely be easier for a prosecutor to 
establish that it was subjectively foreseeable that detainees transferred to Afghan control 
would be tortured, as opposed to having to show that Canada intended to have the 
detainees tortured by the Afghans. Although, an innovative interpretation of the facts 
may be required to demonstrate that a common intention to carry out an unlawful 
purpose (one separate from the crime committed, i.e., not torture) existed between 
Canada and Afghanistan.  
To summarize, under Canadian law the accused Canadian officials would be parties to 
the torture of detainees by Afghan authorities if they were  found to have aided in the 
commission of the offence or to have participated in a common intention to carry out an 
unlawful purpose. To convict on a charge of aiding, the prosecution would need to 
demonstrate that the Canadians intended the Afghans to torture the detainees, or that 
they had actual knowledge of or were wilfully blind to the fact that the Afghans would 
torture the detainees. To convict based on common intention, the prosecution would 
need to demonstrate that a common intention to carry out an unlawful purpose aside 
from torture existed between the Canadians and the Afghans, and that torture was a 
subjectively foreseeable consequence of this unlawful purpose.  
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Although a consideration of this matter under Canadian law, regardless of the outcome, 
would likely satisfy the complementarity principle under the Rome Statute and render the 
case inadmissible to the ICC, the claim of Byers and Schabas that this is a matter for 
which ICC jurisdiction exists must still be addressed.  
b) International Criminal Proceedings under the Rome Statute 
As mentioned previously, a matter will be considered inadmissible to the ICC if a state 
party is already engaged in genuine proceedings concerning the matter. Since DND has 
conducted a Board of Inquiry into In-theatre Handling of Detainees in 2009; the matter 
was addressed by the Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal in Amnesty 
International in 2008,130 and currently the Special Committee on the Canadian Mission 
in Afghanistan is undertaking an investigation into the transfer of detainees from the 
Canadian Forces to Afghan authorities, it seems unlikely that the matter could ever be 
considered admissible to the ICC.  
Hypothetically speaking, if there was a complete collapse of Canadian governmental 
investigatory efforts or if steps were taken by the Attorney General to place guilty parties 
above the law then the matter could become admissible and ICC jurisdiction could be 
exercised in one of three ways: i) the matter could be referred to the Prosecutor by a state 
party; ii) it could be referred by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the 
Charter of the UN; or iii) the Prosecutor could initiate an investigation.131 The likelihood 
of having the matter referred by a state party is possible but not likely. Since Canada is 
not alone accused of being complicit in war crimes but is joined by all participating 
members of ISAF (including all members of NATO and additional “friends” of NATO), 
it is likely that the collective influence wielded by those accused will deter any state 
referrals. For similar reasons, the Security Council is not likely to refer the issue 
considering several of the permanent five members are also members of the ISAF 
operation and it would not be in their interest to see the matter come before the ICC. The 
only remaining option for the ICC to exercise jurisdiction is at the discretion of the 
Prosecutor.  
The current ICC Prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, has made it clear in statements to the 
media that he is prepared to investigate crimes committed by western nations: “I 
prosecute whoever is in my jurisdiction. I cannot allow that we are a court just for the 
Third World. If the First World commits crimes, they have to investigate, if they don’t, I 
shall investigate. That’s the rule and we have one rule for everyone.”132 This bold, 
ambitious, and obviously correct statement may overemphasize the resources of the 
Court and its ability to conduct investigations. With a limited budget of approximately 
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#105 011 000133 and five ongoing investigations in Uganda, the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Sudan, the Central African Republic, and Kenya134 the Prosecutor is 
restricted to selecting cases based on the standard of gravity.135 Selecting cases based on 
gravity requires consideration of: the nature, scale, and impact of the crime, and the 
manner of commission. The torture and mistreatment of potentially hundreds if not 
thousands of detainees in Afghanistan is certainly a grave offence which has attracted 
the attention of the Prosecutor. However, the accessory participation of Canadian 
officials in as many as 30 cases136 may not meet the gravity requirement in terms of 
nature and scale, especially when compared with the crimes of other accused that have 
been brought before the Court. In the interests of judicial efficiency, and in light of 
limited and diminishing resources, it seems much more likely that if an investigation is 
initiated it will target the actual perpetrators of the crime, i.e., Afghan officials. Yet in 
order to properly explore Byers and Schabas argument, it must be imagined that the ICC 
has been provided with the ability to investigate any and all admissible matters, 
regardless of gravity. 
Article 8(1) of the Rome Statute declares that “the Court shall have jurisdiction in respect 
of war crimes”, and paragraph 2(c)(i) defines war crimes as including acts of “violence 
to life and person” committed against detainees during an armed conflict. Unlike the 
War Crimes Act, the Rome Statute has a self-contained model of participation in Article 
25 which includes both principal and accessory modes that will incur criminal 
responsibility. Once again, since Canada is not accused of directly committing acts of 
torture only the accessory modes of participation could apply, including: Article 25(3)(c) 
“aids, abets, or otherwise assists” or Article 25(3)(d) “in any other way contributes to a 
crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose”.  
Prior jurisprudence from the international tribunals, and the wording of Article 25(3)(c) 
itself, suggests various interpretations of the conduct and fault requirements. The 
accused accessory is required to have provided assistance to the principal that was 
“direct and substantial” or “any form at all”. Although this ambiguity in the law is 
generally problematic, it is largely irrelevant in the case of the accused Canadians since 
the act of providing the victims to the alleged perpetrators meets even the highest 
threshold for conduct. The ambiguity of the fault requirement is more of a concern in 
this case. Article 25(3)(c) requires the acts of the accused to have been committed “for 
the purpose” of facilitating the principal. Some commentators have interpreted this to 
mean that specific intent is required,137 meaning the Prosecutor would have to 
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demonstrate that for each individual detainee transferred from Canadian custody to the 
Afghans and subsequently tortured, the Canadians intended that detainee to be tortured. 
Other commentators have denied that the standard is as high as specific intent, but have 
agreed that more than mere knowledge is necessary. Presumably, this would suggest that 
the level of knowledge required to satisfy the purpose requirement would be irrefutable 
knowledge of the fact that the detainee would be tortured if transferred such that any 
denial of intent or purpose to bring about this consequence would not be credible.  
Based on these two possible interpretations of the fault requirement, the question before 
the court would be: is there evidence of a specific Canadian intent to have the detainees 
tortured? In the alternative, if the lower standard were accepted, the question before the 
Court would be:  did the Canadians know with sufficient certainty that the detainees 
would be tortured, such that any denial of intent to bring about this consequence is not 
credible? Once again, these are high subjective standards that cannot be satisfied by 
evidence of recklessness or negligence and are elements which only the yet unknown 
facts will be able to speak to.  
Article 25(3)(d) poses its own problems for interpretation regarding the requisite conduct 
and fault standards. The conduct requirement of “in any other way contributes” poses no 
bar to prosecution in this case since the Canadian act of providing the victims 
undoubtedly contributed to their torture. This contribution, however, must be made to 
the commission of a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. 
Identifying this group may be a difficult task for the Prosecutor; are the Afghan 
authorities a group of persons acting with a common criminal purpose? Are “Afghan 
authorities” in this case defined as the NDS, the Afghan National Army, the Afghan 
National Police, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of National Defence, or the 
entire Afghan government? Identifying a common criminal purpose in any of these 
groups could be difficult as each represents a large, multifaceted government 
organization. While the members of any of these groups might engage in criminal 
conduct it could be difficult to link the individual acts of criminality to the general 
purpose of the organization. This is similar to the situation the IMT faced when trying to 
prosecute the criminal organization charges. In that case, four of the accused seven 
organizations in the Nazi government were acquitted because the IMT had not been 
convinced that an individual who (e.g.) joined the armed forces would have been aware 
that he was becoming a member of something as tangible as a “group”.  
The most likely candidate for a group of persons acting with a common criminal purpose 
is the NDS—Afghanistan’s domestic intelligence agency. Given the nature of the 
intelligence trade, and its propensity to operate on the border between law and 
criminality, intelligence agencies are often singled out as organizations that operate 
under a common criminal purpose. However, just because the NDS engages in 
intelligence gathering activities does not mean it is a criminal organization by default. To 
accuse the NDS of having a common criminal purpose the Prosecutor would have to 
identify that purpose and demonstrate that it was pervasively held among the NDS 
membership. Aside from the difficulty the Prosecutor might face in adducing this type of 
evidence, another problem raised by this accusation is that countless states, international 
organizations and non-governmental organizations are currently working to support the 
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operations of the Afghan government; many states, particularly those participating in 
ISAF, even work closely with and in support of the Afghan security forces including the 
NDS. If the Prosecutor  was to accuse the NDS of having a common criminal purpose, 
then under Article 25(3)(d) anyone who contributed to the newly deemed criminal 
conduct of the NDS and is said to have had knowledge of the newly deemed criminal 
purpose inherits criminal responsibility for any crimes the NDS may have committed. 
Ironically, this widely cast net of criminal responsibility could potentially catch not only 
those currently accused of being complicit in war crimes, but also some of their accusers. 
To satisfy the fault requirement of Article 25(3)(d) the accused’s contribution must: (i) 
be intentional and (ii) must be made with the aim of furthering the group’s criminal 
activity or common purpose, or with knowledge of the group’s intention to commit the 
crime. The intentional contribution element requires, at a minimum, voluntary conduct. 
It is likely the element of voluntarism would be easily satisfied, since it is not likely the 
Canadian Forces surrendered the detainees to the Afghan authorities by accident or 
under duress. However, who the Canadians surrendered the detainees to may bring the 
element of voluntarism into question in some instances. For example, the Canadian 
Forces may have transferred a detainee to the Afghan National Army who was 
subsequently transferred them to the NDS where they were tortured. In that case, the 
Canadians might argue that they never intended to contribute to the NDS’s activities but 
only intended to transfer the detainee to the Afghan National Army.  
To satisfy the second part of the fault requirement, Canada  must have supported the 
Afghan authorities’ criminal activities or common purpose, or have had knowledge of 
their intention to commit the crime of torture. To be considered in support of criminal 
activities or a common criminal purpose, the Prosecutor would have to adduce evidence 
of (e.g.) an extraordinary rendition-type program, or clear Canadian approval of certain 
interrogation methods in Afghan detention centres. Absent such evidence, the claim may 
be hard to substantiate. A lower standard that might be  more attractive to the Prosecutor 
would be to demonstrate that the Canadians were aware of the Afghan’s intention to 
torture victims. To establish this, evidence would be required that indicated a 
premeditated intent to torture specific detainees on the side of the Afghans and actual 
knowledge of this intent on the side of the Canadians.  
To summarize, under international law the accused Canadian officials would be 
criminally responsible for the torture of detainees by Afghan authorities if they were 
found to have aided, abetted or otherwise assisted the Afghans for the purpose of 
facilitating torture. Alternatively, they may be criminally responsible if they intentionally 
contributed in any way to the torture of the detainees if the torture was carried out by a 
group with a common purpose, and the Canadians were either supportive of the group’s 
purpose or aware of its intention to commit torture. To convict the Canadians based on 
aiding, abetting or otherwise assisting, the Prosecutor would need to demonstrate that the 
Canadians specifically intended the detainees to be tortured and transferred them for this 
reason. Although actual knowledge that torture would be the inevitable outcome of 
transferring may suffice. To convict the Canadians of supporting a group with a common 
criminal purpose, the Prosecutor would first have to identify such a group and establish 
evidence of a pervasively held criminal purpose. If successful, the Prosecutor would then 
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have to establish that Canada was aware of this criminal purpose and supportive of it, or 
was simply aware of the group’s specific intent to commit torture.      
As many have suspected, the application of both Canadian law and international law in 
this case will largely turn on who among the Canadian officials knew what. If it can be 
established that specific detainees who were transferred from Canadian custody to 
Afghan custody were tortured, then it will be crucial to determine if Canadian officials 
knew this would be inevitable. Human rights advocates may believe that given the 
findings of reports produced by organizations such as Amnesty International, 
establishing Canadian knowledge of this practice should be no more than a mere 
formality. It may turn out when the facts come to light that the evidence is overwhelming 
and this interpretation is essentially correct. However, if the testimony heard before the 
Special Committee so far is any indication, it is far more likely that at the end of the day 
the evidence will be vague and incomplete, and the high level of subjective fault  
required for the alleged crimes will be difficult to establish.  
CONCLUSION 
The case of complicity in the torture of Afghan detainees raises complex and 
controversial questions regarding the nature of accessory liability, particularly: how 
many degrees of separation can exist between the accessory and the principal before the 
accessory’s  participation loses the flavour of criminal responsibility?  
Originally, under the doctrine of complicity the accessory was required to have 
contributed directly to the commission of the crime. The contribution did not need to be 
conditio sine qua non, but did require a strong causal link to the prohibited consequence 
of the principal’s actions. Over time this strong conduct requirement has diminished to 
“direct and substantial” to “substantial” to “in any way assists”. Under Canadian law, the 
contribution is not even required to have any affect whatsoever on the commission of the 
crime and the principal does not even need to be aware that any contribution has been 
made. Regressing even further, under conspiracy theories an individual may not 
contribute to the commission of the crime at all or even have knowledge of its 
commission. If the accused was part of a criminal agreement which can in some way be 
related to the crime that was committed, then the conduct requirement is satisfied. This 
theory of liability goes even further in the criminal organizations doctrine and JCE. In 
both theories, an individual may not even be a party to a criminal agreement, but rather 
to a vague, amorphous criminal purpose, one which can in some way be linked to the 
crime that has been committed.    
Advocates of accessory liability claim that the expansive reach permitted by a weak 
conduct requirement is balanced by a strong fault requirement. Originally, this 
requirement demanded that the accused intended the specific consequences of the 
principal’s actions. Over time this high subjective fault standard has become as fleeting 
as the conduct requirement (particularly within the international context). Eventually, the 
accused needed only to have knowledge of the principal’s intentions, or be wilfully blind 
to it. Under the theories of conspiracy and JCE the knowledge requirement was dropped 
in favour of a recklessness standard which often resembles negligence. Under the 
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criminal organizations doctrine, subjective foresight was not even required; if the 
accused was aware of the general criminal purpose of the organization to which they 
were a member, then they were vicariously liable for all the crimes committed by the 
organization, foreseeable or not.  
A further issue of concern is the treatment of accessories relative to principals. 
Originally, conviction as an accessory to a crime was distinct from conviction as a 
principal. Under the criminal law reform project in England in the late 19th century, this 
changed so there was no distinction between accessories and principals. This unitary 
approach to criminal participation has not been adopted by all domestic legal systems, 
but it is prevalent in common law states and there is evidence to suggest it has been 
adopted in international criminal law. Under the Rome Statute, those who commit an 
offence are “criminally responsible” and so too are those who aid, abet, or otherwise 
assist without any apparent distinction.  
It may be reasonable to suggest that an individual who voluntarily and intentionally 
drives the getaway car is equally guilty of robbery as the person who actually carries the 
money out of the vault. Similarly, it may be reasonable to suggest that the individual 
who voluntarily and intentionally acted as a guard at Auschwitz is equally guilty of 
genocide as the individual who operated the gas chambers. However, as the degrees of 
separation increase the reasonableness of this approach seems to decrease. Under the 
international complicity doctrines, an individual who has participated in a group with a 
common criminal purpose, such as Al Qaeda, through some minor contribution, such as 
a nominal monetary donation, and is linked to the organization, for example by being 
part of a listserv, is an accessory to the crimes committed by the group, such as the 
attacks of September 11th. It is one thing to convict this person for the distinct crime of 
supporting an illegal organization, but should such a person be found as guilty of 
murdering nearly 3000 people as the individual who actually flew a plane into the World 
Trade Centre?     
Complicity has always been a slippery slope of individual criminal responsibility. 
Despite the egregious nature of the crime, and despite the strong societal desire to bring 
justice to victims, the essence of complicity is its derivative nature—the accessory is 
prosecuted for the crimes of someone else. However, the adoption of complicity as a 
criminalized mode of participation in international law was unavoidable. The crimes that 
attract the jurisdiction of international tribunals, and now the ICC, are not only the most 
serious but are also inherently collective.138 In general, lone perpetrators are not capable 
of committing the types of atrocities that international criminal law was designed to 
address. These particular types of crimes can only be brought about through collective 
action which is as dependent on the accessory as it is the principal. Complicity 
developed in domestic law to address this type of collective crime, and it was necessarily 
adopted by international criminal law for the same reason. Yet the fact remains, 
complicity means holding an individual responsible for the physical acts of another 
person, and so caution must be had to minimize the risk of injustice. 
                                                       
138 See e.g. Ohlin, supra note 97 at 72-74. 
